Machine learning algorithms that are applied to sensitive data pose a distinct threat to privacy. A growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific private information in the training data to an attacker, either through their structure or their observable behavior. However, the underlying cause of this privacy risk is not well understood beyond a handful of anecdotal accounts that suggest overfitting and influence might play a role.
Introduction
Machine learning has emerged as an important technology, enabling a wide range of applications including computer vision, machine translation, health analytics, and advertising, among others. The fact that many compelling applications of this technology involve the collection and processing of sensitive personal data has given rise to concerns about privacy [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . In particular, when machine learning algorithms are applied to private training data, the resulting models might unwittingly leak information about that data either through their behavior (i.e., through a black-box attack ) or through the details of their structure (i.e., through a white-box attack ).
Although there has been a significant amount of work aimed at developing machine learning algorithms that satisfy definitions such as differential privacy [8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] , the factors that bring about specific types of privacy risk in applications of standard machine learning algorithms are not well understood. Following the connection between differential privacy and stability from statistical learning theory [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] , one such factor that has started to emerge [4, 7] as a likely culprit is overfitting. A machine learning model is said to overfit its training data when its performance on unseen test data diverges from the performance observed during training, i.e., its generalization error is large. Aside from possibly limiting the usefulness of models in practice, overfitting causes observable differences in behavior on training data that might lead to the leakage of sensitive information.
A second factor identified as relevant to privacy risk is influence [5] , a functional quantity that arises often in the study of Boolean functions [18] . Influence measures the extent to which a particular input to a function is able to cause changes to its output. In the context of machine learning privacy, influential features of a model may give an active attacker the ability to extract information by observing the changes they cause.
In this paper, we characterize the effect that overfitting and influence have on the advantage of adversaries who attempt to infer specific facts about the data used to train machine learning models. We formalize quantitative advantage measures that capture the privacy risk to training data posed by two types of attack, membership inference [6, 7] and model inversion [3, 4, 5, 8] . For each type of attack, we analyze the advantage in terms of generalization error (overfitting) and influence for several concrete black-box adversaries. We show that our analytic results hold in practice by evaluating the attacks on several real datasets, controlling for overfitting through regularization and model structure.
Membership inference Training data membership inference attacks aim to determine whether a given data point was present in the training data used to build a model. Although the privacy risk may not at first glance appear to be substantial, the threat is clear in settings such as health analytics where the distinction between case and control groups might reveal an individual's predisposition to sensitive conditions. This type of attack has been extensively studied in the adjacent area of genomics [19, 20] , and more recently in the context of machine learning [6, 7] .
Our analysis shows a clear dependence of membership advantage on generalization error (Section 3.3), and in some cases the relationship is directly proportional (Theorem 3). Our experiments on real data confirm the dependence (Section 6.2), even for models that do not conform to the theoretical assumptions made by our analysis. In one set of experiments, we apply a particularly straightforward attack to deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) using several datasets examined in prior work on membership inference [7] . Despite requiring significantly less computation (i.e., only a single query to the model, and no preprocessing) and little adversarial background knowledge, the advantage of this attack comes close (5-10%) to that of a previous attack [7] .
Our formal and empirical analyses both illustrate that overfitting is a sufficient condition for membership vulnerability in popular machine learning algorithms. However, it is not a necessary precondition (Theorem 6) , and in fact we show that any stable learning rule (i.e., one that does not overfit) satisfying certain conditions, which are common in practice, corresponds to a set of "leaky" learning rules that are nearly as stable, but reveal exact membership information. We implement this construction to train deep CNNs (Section 6.4), an observe that not only is it possible for advantage to remain high regardless of the model's generalization behavior, but that predictive accuracy incurs very little penalty (1-5%) as a result.
Model inversion In a model inversion attack, the adversary uses access to a machine learning model and incomplete information about a data point to infer the missing information for that point. For example, in work by Fredrikson et al. [4] , the adversary is given partial information about an individual's medical record, along with a model trained on features appearing in that record as well as genotype, and attempts to infer the individual's genotype.
We formally characterize the advantage of a model inversion adversary as its ability to infer a target feature given an incomplete point from the training data, relative to its ability to do so for points from the general population (Section 4). This approach is distinct from the way that inversion advantage has largely been characterized in prior work [3, 4, 5] , where the priority was on empirically measuring advantage relative to a "simulator" who is not given access to the model. We offer an alternative definition of inversion advantage that corresponds to this characterization, but find that it does not allow our analysis to isolate the risk that the model poses specifically to individuals in the training data, which motivates our use of the former relative definition for this work instead.
Our formal analysis shows that inversion, as with membership, is indeed sensitive to overfitting. However, we find that influence must be factored in as well to understand when overfitting will lead to privacy risk (Section 4.1). Interestingly, the risk to individuals in the training data is greatest when these two factors are "in balance". Regardless of how large the generalization error becomes, an inversion adversary's ability to learn more about the training data than the general population vanishes as influence increases.
Connection between membership and inversion The two types of attack that we examine may seem different on their face, but a closer look reveals that they are deeply related. We build reductions between the two, assuming oracle access to either type of adversary, and characterize the reduction's advantage in terms of the oracle's assumed advantage. Our results suggest that inversion advantage implies membership advantage (Theorem 8), but that the opposite is not necessarily true: the ability to infer membership does not always imply the ability perform model inversion (Theorem 9).
Our reductions are not merely of theoretical interest, and function as practical attacks as well. We implemented the most sophisticated reduction for model inversion, and evaluated it on real data (Section 6.3). Our results show that particularly when generalization error is high, the reduction adversary actually outperforms a model inversion attack given in prior work [4] by a significant margin.
Summary This paper explores the relationships between privacy, overfitting, and influence in machine learning models. Using new formalizations of training set membership and model inversion attacks, which are themselves useful contributions of this paper, we analyze the privacy risk that black-box variants of these attacks pose to individuals in the training data theoretically and experimentally. Our results give analytic quantities for the attacker's advantage in terms of properties of the training algorithm (i.e., generalization error) as well as functional properties of the models themselves (i.e., influence) and show that certain configurations of these properties imply privacy risk. By introducing a new type of membership inference attack in which the training algorithm colludes with an adversary to expose information about the training data, we find that the converse does not hold: machine learning models can pose immediate threats to privacy without suffering from overfitting or otherwise behaving differently from standard expectations. Finally, we study the underlying connections between membership inference and model inversion attacks, and find suprising relationships that lead to further new attacks that work well on real data.
Background
Throughout the paper we focus on privacy risks related to machine learning algorithms. We begin by introducing basic notation and concepts from learning theory.
Notation and preliminaries
Let z = (x, y) ∈ X × Y be a data point, where x represents a set of features or attributes and y a response. In a typical machine learning setting, and thus throughout this paper, it is assumed that the features x are given as input to the model, and the response y is returned. Let D represent a distribution of data points, and let S ∼ D n be an ordered list of n points, which we will refer to as a dataset, training set, or training data interchangeably, sampled i.i.d. from D. We will frequently make use of the following methods of sampling a data point z:
• z ∼ S: i is picked uniformly at random from {1, . . . , n}, and z is set equal to the i-th element of S.
• z ∼ D: z is chosen according to the distribution D.
When it is clear from the context, we will refer to these sampling methods as sampling from the dataset and sampling from the distribution, respectively.
Unless stated otherwise, our results pertain to the standard machine learning setting, wherein a model A S is obtained by applying a machine learning algorithm A to a dataset S. Models reside in the set X → Y, and are assumed to approximately minimize the expected value of a loss function over S. If z = (x, y), the loss function (A S , z) measures how much A S (x) differs from y. In this paper, we use the 0-1 loss function (Equation 1) when the response domain is discrete.
Unless stated otherwise, when the response is continuous we use the squared-error loss (Equation 2) .
Additionally, when the response y is continuous, it is common for many types of models to assume that y is normally distributed in some way. For example, linear regression assumes that y is normally distributed given x [21] . To analyze these cases, we use the error function erf, which is defined in Equation 3 .
Intuitively, if is normally distributed and x ≥ 0, then erf(x/ √ 2) represents the probability that is within x standard deviations of the mean.
Stability and generalization
An algorithm is stable if a small change to its input causes limited change in its output. In the context of machine learning, the algorithm in question is typically a training algorithm A, and a "small change" corresponds to the replacement of a single data point in S. This is made precise in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (On-Average-Replace-One (ARO) Stability). Given S = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∼ D n and an additional point z ∼ D, define S (i) = (z 1 , . . . , z i−1 , z , z i+1 , . . . , z n ). Let stable : N → R be a monotonically decreasing function. Then a training algorithm A is On-Average-Replace-One-Stable (or ARO-Stable) on loss function with rate stable (n) if the following inequality holds:
When a learning algorithm is not stable, the models that it produces might overfit the training data. Overfitting is characterized by large values for the quantity shown in Equation 4 .
In other words, A S overfits to S if A S 's expected loss on samples drawn i.i.d. from D is much greater than its observed loss on the dataset S. Equation 4 characterizes overfitting for a particular model, but we are generally interested in the degree to which overfitting occurs for models produced by A in expectation over random draws of S. This is characterized as the average generalization error (Definition 4), which is the difference between the average true error (Definition 3) and the average empirical error (Definition 2). Definition 2 (Average empirical error). The average empirical error of a machine learning algorithm A on D is defined as:
Definition 3 (Average true error). The average true error of a machine learning algorithm A on D is defined as:
Definition 4 (Average generalization error). The average generalization error of a machine learning algorithm A on D is defined as the difference of the true error and the empirical error:
For brevity, when n, D, and are unambiguous from the context, we will write R emp (A), R true (A), and R gen (A) instead. The connection between average generalization and stability is formalized by Shalev-Shwartz et al. [22] , who show that an algorithm's ability to achieve a given generalization error (as a function of n) is biconditional with its ARO-stability rate.
Stability is closely related to the popular notion of differential privacy [23] , given in Definition 5.
Definition 5 (Differential privacy). An algorithm A : X n → Y is satisfies -differential privacy if for all S, S ∈ X n that differ in the value at a single index 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all y ∈ Y , the following holds:
Adversaries
We consider two types of adversaries in this work, corresponding to parties who wish to mount either membership inference or model inversion attacks. Each type of attack is defined by an experiment wherein the adversary is given a model and some information about the circumstances in which it was generated, and is expected to guess a particular fact about the model's training dataset. If the adversary's guess is correct then the experiment returns the value 1 and the adversary is said to "win", and the experiment returns 0 otherwise. The experiment for each attack is used to define a measure of advantage that characterizes the adversary's expected chance of winning. We save a detailed discussion of the adversaries themselves, the experiments, and the advantage measures for their respective sections (Section 3 for membership, Section 4 for model inversion), and here outline general assumptions that we make of each type. Although we are not primarily concerned with the complexity of attacks presented in this work, we generally assume that adversaries are efficient and run in polynomial time. The parameter on which this polynomial-time constraint depends differs slightly for each type of adversary (i.e., membership inference or model inversion), but in both cases is roughly dependent on the dimension of the dataset and its cardinality. We further assume that adversaries operate in a black-box fashion with respect to models. Specifically, when an adversary is given a model as an input, this means that it is allowed to make an adaptive sequence of queries to the model and observe its outputs, subject to the polynomial-time constraint.
Membership Inference Attacks
In a membership inference attack, the adversary attempts to infer whether a specific point was included in the dataset used to train a given model. The adversary is given a data point z = (x, y), access to a model A S , the size of the model's training set |S| = n, and the distribution D that the training set was drawn from. With this information the adversary must decide whether z ∈ S. For the purposes of this discussion, we do not distinguish whether A's access to A S is "black-box", i.e., consisting only of input/output queries, or "white-box", i.e., involving the internal structure of the model itself. However, unless otherwise noted all of the attacks presented in this section assume black-box access. Experiment 1 below formalizes membership inference attacks. The experiment first samples a fresh dataset from D, and then flips a coin b to decide whether to draw the adversary's challenge point z from the training set or the original distribution. A is then given the challenge, along with the additional information described above, and must guess the value of b. Experiment 1 (Membership experiment Exp M (A, A, n, D)). Let A be an adversary, A be a learning algorithm, n be a positive integer, and D be a distribution over data points (x, y). The membership experiment proceeds as follows:
1. Sample S ∼ D n , and let A S = A(S). where the probabilities are taken over the coin flips of A, the random choices of S and b, and the random data point z ∼ S or z ∼ D.
Equivalently, the right-hand side can be expressed as the difference between A's true and false positive rates, as shown below: Using Experiment 1, Definition 6 gives an advantage measure that characterizes how well an adversary can distinguish between z ∼ S and z ∼ D after being given the model. This is slightly different from the sort of membership inference described in some prior work [6, 7] , which distinguishes between z ∼ S and z ∼ D \ S. We are interested in measuring the degree to which A S reveals membership to A, and not in the degree to which any background knowledge of S or D does. If we sample z from D \ S instead of D, the adversary could gain advantage by noting which data points are more likely to have been sampled into S ∼ D n . This does not reflect how leaky the model is, and Definition 6 rules it out.
In fact, the only way to gain advantage is through access to the model. In the membership experiment Exp M (A, A, n, D), the adversary A must determine the value of b by using z, A S , n, and D. Of these inputs, n and D do not depend on b, and we have the following for all z:
However, Definition 6 does not give the adversary credit for predicting that a point drawn from D (i.e., when b = 1), which also happens to be in S, is a member of S. As a result, the maximum advantage that an adversary can hope to achieve is 1 − µ(n, D, where µ(n, D) = Pr S∼D n ,z∼D [z ∈ S]. We call µ(n, D) the membership collision rate (Definition 7), and will reference this quantity frequently in the remainder of this section. In real settings µ(n, D) is likely to be exceedingly small, so this is not an issue in practice.
Definition 7 (Membership collision rate). The membership collision rate of D for datasets of size n, denoted µ(n, D), is the probability of re-sampling a point from S ∼ D n in one attempt:
Optimal adversaries
Considering membership adversaries in the framework given above, we begin by asking whether an "optimal" adversary exists. Being primarily interested in black box attacks, the notion of optimality that is interesting here need not be specific to the particulars of any single class of models or training algorithms, and should apply universally to models that adhere to the model interface described in Section 2.1 for a particular choice of domain X × Y. The corresponding notion of optimality is given in Definition 8. This definition is with respect to a distribution D, and requires that A's advantage be within (n) of any other adversary's for all training algorithms on a chosen D for some function on the training set size.
Note that Definition 8 does not require that A necessarily achieve high advantage on all models, as we make few assumptions about models' behavior, in particular their association with S. We cannot, for example, expect an adversary to perform well on a model that is statistically independent from its training dataset. But even in such cases, we should expect an optimal adversary to do about as well as any other adversary.
Definition 8 (Optimal membership adversary). A membership adversary A is optimal on D with rate (n) if for all adversaries A' and learning algorithms A, the following holds for some non-negative monotonic decreasing function : N → R of n:
The probabilities in this expression are taken over the choices of z, b, and S in Experiment 1, and the randomness of A and A .
No optimal adversaries. Considering the information given to A in Experiment 1, an optimal adversary should compare
. However, if b = 0 (i.e., z is in S), then z and A S both depend on S, which the adversary does not know. Furthermore, unless A assumes something about A S , then we cannot further simplify the expression Pr[z, A S |b = 0]. This suggests that adversaries satisfying Definition 8 may not exist for reasonable values of .
Indeed, Theorem 1 below shows that under mild conditions, no adversary satisfying Definition 8 exists for (n) noticeably far from 1. This implies that there are learning algorithms that produce models on which only certain adversaries can achieve non-negligible advantage. Furthermore, these adversaries are "myopic" in the sense that they are unable to achieve non-negligible advantage on other learning algorithms. Thus, there is no point in searching for universal membership adversaries that succeed despite making few assumptions of their targets.
We stress that the assumptions made by Theorem 1 are reasonable, and encompass a large class of scenarios that are likely to arise in practice. The first requires that the size of the training set S is at most polynomial in its dimension d. This is typical in practice, as datasets larger than this will quickly saturate the support of D, and thus contain many low-probability "outlier" points that may be detrimental to effective learning. The second assumption is related to the membership collision rate (Definition 7), which is the probability that a sample drawn from D in Experiment 1 is already in S. In other words, the membership collision rate is the probability that an individual sampled from the "general population" happens to be in a particular training set. In order for Theorem 1 to demonstrate the property described above, i.e. that no optimal adversary exists for (n) noticeably far from 1, this probability must remain negligible in the size n of S. Theorem 1. Let d be the dimension of X, and assume that the size n of S remains bounded by some polynomial p(n). Suppose that x uniquely determines the points (x, y) in D. Then there does not exist an optimal membership adversary for any such that (n) < 1 − µ(n, D) − negl(d) for some negligible function negl.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that
1} be a keyed pseudorandom function, and K be uniformly sampled from {0, 1} d . On receiving S, the training algorithm A K returns the following model:
We now define a membership adversary A K who is hard-wired with a particular key K:
Recalling our assumption that given z = (x, y) ∼ D, for all z ∼ D where z = (x, y ) and y = y we have Pr[z ] = 0, we can derive the advantage of A K on the corresponding trainer A K in possession of the same key K:
Now consider two distinct uniformly-sampled K α for α ∈ {0, 1}. Observe that when the adversary for K 0 (A K0 ) is run on the learning algorithm for K 1 (A K1 ), it gets nowhere (and vice versa). In other words, A Kα achieves no advantage on A K1−α :
We point out that in the derivation above, the probabilities are over the uniform random selection of K 0 , K 1 as well as the random draws of z = (x, y). This gives us that neither of A Kα for α ∈ {0, 1} can possibly satisfy Definition 8 except when (n) ≥ 1 − µ(n, D), and we assumed that µ(n, D) is negligible in n. So far we have shown that no adversary with specific knowledge of the K used by A K is optimal with rate better than 1 − negl(n). To finish the proof, we show that when the adversary doesn't know K, their advantage fails to come within 1 − negl(n) of A K . Precisely, we show that the advantage of any such A fails to satisfy the following condition when K is drawn uniformly from {0, 1} d :
We prove this by reduction, constructing a polynomial-time distinguisher D that is given access to an oracle O as well as A . The oracle O is instantiated as either F K for a uniformly sampled K, or as a random function f uniformly chosen from Func {0,1} d →{0,1} . Because F is a pseudorandom function, it should be the case that D's behavior is nearly identical in either case:
In the above, the probability is taken over the random choice of K and the randomness of D. The D we construct emulates Experiment 1 for A as shown below, and whenever A succeeds, it predicts that O corresponds to F K .
Note that because n = p(d) for some polynomial p, D runs in polynomial time. If D's oracle is F K , then A will behave exactly as it would in Experiment 1 when the learning algorithm from Equation 5 is used, and so:
On the other hand if D's oracle is the random function f , then without direct access to O the output of A O S is purely random. For any b ∈ {0, 1},
Note that z is also independent of b, so all of the inputs given to A are independent of b and the probability that it outputs b = b is exactly 1/2. This gives us:
Combining Equations 9 and 10 with our assumption from Equation 8 gives us that:
Combining the above with Equation 7 gives us:
This completes the proof.
Corollary 1. Let l be the min-entropy of D, and d the dimension of X. If n ≤ p(d) for some polynomial p and d ≤ lc for some constant c, then there does not exist an optimal membership adversary for any such that (n) < 1 − negl(n).
Proof. Note the following of the membership collision rate µ(n, D):
The rightmost relation follows from Bernoulli's inequality. Given the above, with d/c ≤ l and n ≤ p(d) for polynomial p we conclude that µ(n, D) is negligible in n, so applying Theorem 1 gives us the proof.
The proof of Theorem 1 constructs a set of learning algorithms and membership adversaries that collude by sharing a secret key. The learning algorithms produce models that essentially use the key to encrypt a single-bit message that contains the membership of a queried point. The adversary in posession of this key can easily decrypt the message, thus achieving high advantage. Its advantage is not perfect, however, due to the possibility in Experiment 1 that b = 1 but z ∼ D happened to also be in S. Thus, its concrete advantage is 1 − µ(n, D), which is negligibly close to 1 by assumption. Other adversaries who do not know the key are unable to decrypt the models' outputs, and so achieve negligible advantage.
Corollary 1 shows that when datasets are sized polynomial in their dimension, then sufficiently high min-entropy in D is all that is required to preclude optimal membership adversaries. In particular when the min-entropy is within a constant factor of the dimension, then the membership collision rate is negligible in n and Theorem 1 applies. However, this condition is not free as l = − log 2 max z Pr[z] comes arbitrarily close to zero as max z Pr[z] approaches 1, so the result might not always apply.
Stability and its role in advantage
We now move on to a result (Theorem 2) that bounds the advantage of an adversary who attempts a membership attack on a differentially-private [23] . Differential privacy imposes strict limits on the degree to which any point in the training data can affect the outcome of a computation, and it is commonly understood that differential privacy will limit membership inference attacks. Thus it is not surprising that the advantage is limited by a function of . Theorem 2. Let A be an -differentially private learning algorithm and A be a membership adversary. Then A's advantage is bounded as follows:
Proof. First note that we can write the advantage in Definition 6 as follows:
In the following, for
Observe that when z ∼ D and S ∼ D n , A(z , A S , n, D) and A(z i , A S (i) , n, D) are equi-distributed for all i. So we can write:
Using the above two equalities and linearity of expectation, we have that:
Without loss of generality for the case where models reside in an infinite domain, assume that the models produced by A come from the set {A 1 , . . . , A k }. Differential privacy guarantees that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k:
Using this inequality, we can rewrite and bound the right-hand side of Equation 12 :
The above is at most e − 1 since A(z, A j , n, D) ≤ 1 for any z, A j , n, and D.
Differential privacy is a strong notion of stability in that it requires, for any dataset S and model A S produced by A with non-zero probability, that A S also has non-zero probability on S (i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Theorem 2 shows that such strong stability gives protection against membership inference attacks. However, the types of stability usually considered in machine learning settings, such as ARO-stability, are strictly weaker than differential privacy as shown in prior work [8] . It is natural to ask whether these notions also imply protection against membership inference. Unfortunately, Theorem 6 in Section 3.4 shows that this is not the case, and that in fact certain learning algorithms can admit membership adversaries with advantage close to one regardless of their stability rate.
Membership attacks and generalization
In this section, we consider several membership attacks that make general assumptions about the training algorithm used to build the model under attack, the adversary's knowledge of the model and its behavior, and the distribution of the training data. Importantly, the assumptions made by these attacks are consistent with many natural learning techniques widely used in practice, such as linear and logistic regression, support vector machines, and tree models (both regression and classification).
In each case, we examine the relationship between the advantage of the attack and its relationship to how well the model generalizes, and show that generalization behavior is a strong predictor for vulnerability to membership inference attacks. In Section 6.2, we demonstrate that these relationships often hold in practice on real data, when the assumptions used in our analysis do not strictly hold.
Bounded Loss Function
We begin with a straightforward attack that makes minimal assumptions about A S . If the loss function is bounded by come constant max , then the adversary predicts that a query point z is not in S with probability proportional to the model's loss at z. The attack is formalized in Adversary 1.
Theorem 3 states that the membership advantage of this approach is proportional to the generalization error of A, showing that advantage and generalization error are closely related in many common learning settings. In particular, classification settings, where the 0-1 loss function (A S , z) = 1(y = A S (x)) is commonly used, B = 1 yields membership advantage equal to the generalization error. Simply put, high generalization error necessarily results in privacy loss for classification models.
Adversary 1 (Bounded loss function). Suppose (A S , z) ≤ max for some constant max , all S ∼ D n , and all z sampled from S or D. Then, on input z = (x, y), A S , n, and D, the membership adversary A proceeds as follows:
1. Query the model to get A S (x).
Output 1 with probability
Theorem 3. The advantage of Adversary 1 is:
Proof. The proof is a straightforward calculation, but its simplicity serves to illustrate the general form of the remaining proofs in this section. We begin by writing advantage as in the proof of Theorem 2, and proceed by repeated substitution:
Gaussian Error
The technique used by membership Adversary 1 does not work for most regression problems because the loss function is usually unbounded. However, a common assumption for linear regression is that the error of the model is normally distributed. This assumption leads to the strategy described in Adversary 2 that leverages generalization error to achieve membership advantage. The attack assumes that the adversary knows the standard error σ S , σ D of the model on S and D, respectively. The latter can be approximated by measuring error on a test set, but in practice models are sometimes only published with one of these values. Later we will describe strategies for addressing this issue.
is independent of x. Let a be a positive constant. On input z = (x, y), A S , n, and D, the membership adversary A proceeds as follows:
Let
The factor of √ 2 inside the erf in Step 2 exists to correct for the fact that erf is defined to deal with a normal distribution with standard deviation 1/ √ 2. In regression problems that use squared-error loss, the magnitude of the generalization error depends on the scale of the response y. For this reason, in the following we use the ratio R true (A)/R emp (A) = σ D /σ S to measure generalization error. Theorem 4 expresses the advantage of Adversary 4 as a function of this generalization error. Note that the advantage is 0 when σ D /σ S = 1 and approaches 1 as σ D /σ S → ∞, which aligns with intuitions about how advantage should trend with generalization error. Proof. Let f ( ) be the probability density function of . Then, we have
Using an integral from [24] :
Letting α = 1/( √ 2σ S ) and β = a/ √ 2, we get Pr[A = 1|b = 0] = 2 π arctan(aσ S ).
By a similar argument in the case where b = 1, we can solve for the membership advantage Adversary 2 generalizes on the attack for bounded-loss models by probabilistically guessing membership proportional to the magnitude of error. However, whenever A knows exactly what the error distribution is, then it can take a more principled approach by deriving a threshold on the value y − A S (x) that identifies which prediction (b = 0 or 1) is more likely to be correct. The Gaussian error assumption enables this adversary, which is detailed in Adversary 3. Adversary 3 (Threshold). Suppose f ( |b = 0) and f ( |b = 1), the conditional probability density functions of the error, are known in advance. Then, on input z = (x, y), A S , n, and D, the membership adversary A proceeds as follows:
Theorem 5 characterizes the advantage of this adversary in the case of Gaussian error in terms of σ D /σ S . As in Theorem 4, the advantage approaches 1 as σ D /σ S → ∞. Figure 1 shows the graph of this advantage as a function of σ D /σ S and compares it to that of the probabilistic adversary. 
Proof. We have
Let ± eq be the points at which these two probability density functions are equal. Some algebraic manipulation shows that
Moreover if σ S < σ D , then f ( |b = 0) > f ( |b = 1) iff | | < eq . This gives us the following advantage:
Unknown Standard Error In practice, models are often published with just one value of standard error, so the adversary often does not know how σ D compares to σ S . In this case, we assume that σ S ≈ σ D , i.e., that the model does not terribly overfit. More specifically, the probabilistic adversary uses a = 1/σ S to get membership advantage 2 π arctan(σ D /σ S ) − 1 2 . Similarly, the threshold adversary uses eq = σ S , which is the limit of the right-hand side of Equation 13 as σ D approaches σ S . Then, the membership advantage is
Both of these quantities are also graphed in Figure 1 . Alternatively, if the adversary knows which machine learning algorithm was used, it can repeatedly sample S ∼ D n , train the model A S using the sampled S, and measure the error of the model to arrive at a reasonably close approximation of σ S and σ D . 
Other sources of membership advantage
The results in the preceding sections show that overfitting is sufficient for membership advantage. However, models can leak information about the training set in other ways, and thus overfitting is not necessary for membership advantage. For example, the learning rule can produce models that simply output a lossless encoding of the training dataset. This example may seem unconvincing for several reasons: the leakage is obvious, and the "encoded" dataset may not function well as a model. In the rest of this section, we present a general result which shows that overfitting is not necessary for membership leakage and construct an example pair of learning algorithm and adversary that exhibit this behavior.
The main result is given in Theorem 6, which shows that any ARO-stable learning rule A * , with a bounded loss function operating on a finite domain, is associated with an infinite set of vulnerable learning rules {A k } k∈N . Moreover, subject to our assumption from before that µ(n, D) is very small, the stability rate of the vulnerable model A k is not far from that of A * , and for each A k there exists a membership adversary whose advantage is negligibly far (in k) from the maximum advantage possible on D. Simply put, it is often possible to find a suitably leaky version of an ARO-stable learning rule whose generalization behavior is close to that of the original.
The proof of Theorem 6 involves constructing a learning rule A k that leaks precise membership information when queried in a particular way but is otherwise identical to A * . A k assumes that the adversary has knowledge of a secret key that is used to select from a family of pseudorandom functions that define the "special" queries used to extract membership information. In this way, the normal behavior of the model remains largely unchanged, making A k approximately as stable as A * , but the learning algorithm and adversary "collude" to leak information through the model. We require the features x to fully determine y to avoid collisions when the adversary queries the model, which would result in false positives. In practice, many learning problems satisfy this criterion. The full details of the proof are below, but Algorithm 1 and Adversary 4 illustrate the key ideas in this construction informally.
Algorithm 1 (Colluding training algorithm A C ). Let F K : X → X and G K : X → Y be keyed pseudorandom functions, K 1 , . . . , K k be uniformly-chosen keys, and A be a training algorithm. On receiving a training set S, A C proceeds as follows:
for all (x i , y i ) ∈ S, and set S = S ∪ (z 1,j , . . . , z n,j ).
Return
Adversary 4 (Colluding adversary A C ). Let F K : X → X, G K : X → Y and K 1 , . . . , K k be the functions and keys used by A C , and A S be the product of training with A C with those keys. On input z = (x, y), the adversary A C proceeds as follows:
2. Output 0 if y j = G Kj (x) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, Otherwise, output 1.
Theorem 6. Let d = log |X|, m = log |Y|, be a loss function bounded by some constant B, A * be an AROstable learning rule with rate stable (n), and suppose that x uniquely determines the point (x, y) in D. Then for any integer k > 0, there exists an ARO-stable learning rule A k with rate at most stable (n)+knB2 −d +µ(n, D) and adversary A such that:
Proof. The proof constructs a learning algorithm and adversary who share a set of k keys to a pseudorandom function, and use it to communicate membership information through the model's behavior. The secrecy of the shared key is unnecessary, and the proof only relies on the uniformity of the keys and the function's corresponding output. The primary concern is with using the pseudorandom function in a way that preserves the stability of A * as much as possible. Without loss of generality, assume that X
, 1} m be keyed pseudorandom functions, and K j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k be uniformly sampled keys. On receiving S, the training algorithm A K1,...,K k returns the following model:
We now define a membership adversary A K1,...,K k who is hard-wired with keys K 1 , . . . , K k :
Recalling our assumption that the value of x uniquely determines the point (x, y), we can derive the advantage of A K1,...,K k on the corresponding trainer A K1,...,K k in possession of the same keys:
Adv M (A K1,...,K k , A K1,...,K k , n, D) = Pr[A K1,...,K k = 0|b = 0] − Pr[A K1,...,K k = 0|b = 1] = 1 − µ(n, D) − 2 −mk The 2 −mk term comes from the possibility that G Kj (F Kj (x)) = A * S (x) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k by pure chance. Now observe that A * is ARO-stable with rate stable (n). If z = (x, y), we use C S (z) to denote the probability that F Kj (x) collides with F Kj (x i ) for some (x i , y i ) = z i ∈ S and some key K j . Note that by a simple union bound, we have C S (z) ≤ kn2 −d for z ∈ S. Then algebraic manipulation gives us the following, where we write A K S in place of A K1,...,K k S to simplify notation:
Note that the term µ(n, D) on the last line accounts for the possibility that the z sampled at index i in S (i) is already in S, which results in a collision. Thus, A K is ARO-stable with rate stable (n) + knB2 −d , completing the proof.
A key difference between Algorithm 1 and the construction used in the proof is that the model returned by Algorithm 1 belongs to the same class as those produced by A, whereas the proof relies on the fact that A k can return an arbitrary function as long as its black-box behavior is suitable. Obviously, Algorithm 1 will not work well in practice for many classes of models, as they may not have the capacity to store the membership information needed by the adversary while maintaining the ability to generalize.
Interestingly, in Section 6.4 we empirically demonstrate that deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) do in fact have this capacity and generalize perfectly well when trained in the manner of A C . As pointed out by Zhang et al. [25] , deep CNNs often have significantly more parameters than the number of points in the datasets they are trained on, which suggests that although their ability to generalize as measured by the difference between training and test error is remarkably good, they may have the capacity to effectively "memorize" the dataset. Our results supplement their observations, and suggest that this phenomenon may have severe implications for privacy.
Model Inversion
We now consider model inversion attacks [3, 4, 5, 8] , where the goal of the adversary is to guess the value of a sensitive feature given some additional information about the data point and model. To make this explicit in our notation, in this section we assume that data points are triples z = (x, t, y) ∈ X × T × Y, where t is the sensitive feature targeted by the adversary.
Model inversion is formalized in Experiment 2, which proceeds much like Experiment 1. The primary difference is that the adversary is not given the value of t, which it attempts to infer. Exp I (A, A, n, D) ). Let A be an adversary, n be a positive integer, and D be a distribution over data points (x, t, y). The inversion experiment proceeds as follows: In the corresponding advantage measure shown in Definition 9, our goal is to measure the amount of information about t that A S leaks specifically concerning the training data S. Definition 9 accomplishes this by comparing the performance of the adversary when b = 0 in Experiment 2 with that when b = 1. where the probabilities are taken over the coin flips of A, the random choice of S, and the random data point z ∼ S or z ∼ D.
Experiment 2 (Inversion experiment
1. Sample S ∼ D n . 2. Choose b ← {0,
Definition 9 (Inversion advantage). The inversion advantage of A is defined as
This definition has the side effect of incentivizing the adversary to "game the system" by performing poorly when it thinks that b = 1. To remove this incentive, one may consider using a simulator S, which does not receive the model as an input, when b = 1. This definition is formalized below: The flaw with this alternative definition is that higher model accuracy will lead to higher inversion advantage regardless of how accurate the model is for the general population. Broadly, there are two ways for a model to perform better on the training data: it can overfit to the training data, or it can learn a general trend in the distribution D. In this paper, we take the view that the adversary's ability to infer t in the latter case is due not to the model but pre-existing patterns in D. To allow capturing the difference between overfitting and learning a general trend, we use Definition 9 in the following analysis and leave a more complete exploration of Definition 10 as future work. While adversaries that "game the system" may seem problematic, the effectiveness of such adversaries is indicative of privacy loss because their existence implies the ability to infer membership, as demonstrated by a reduction from membership inference to model inversion in Section 5.1.
Inversion, generalization, and influence
In this section, we look at the model inversion attack of Fredrikson et al. [4] under the advantage given in Definition 9. We point out that this is a novel analysis, as this advantage is defined to reflect the extent to which an inversion attack reveals information about individuals in S. While prior work [3, 4] has empirically evaluated inversion accuracy over corresponding training and test sets, our goal is to analyze the factors that lead to increased privacy risk specifically for members of the training data. To that end, we illustrate the relationship between advantage and generalization error as we did in the case of membership inference (Section 3.3). We also explore the role of feature influence, which in this case corresponds to the degree to which changes to sensitive feature t affects the value A S (x, t). In Section 6.3, we show that the formal relationships described here often extend to attacks on real data where formal assumptions may fail to hold.
The attack described by Fredrikson et al. [4] is intended for linear regression models and is thus subject to the Gaussian error assumption discussed in Section 3.3. The attack assumes that A is able to approximate the parameters of A S 's Gaussian error distribution, e.g., by using a published standard error value. We denote the true error density function by f , and the adversary's approximation by f A . It also assumes that the sensitive feature t is drawn from a finite set of possible values t 1 , . . . , t m , and that the marginal distribution of t in D is known.
The attack is shown in Adversary 5. For each t i , the adversary counterfactually assumes that t = t i and computes what the error of the model would be. It then uses this information to update the a priori marginal distribution of t and picks the value t i with the greatest likelihood.
Adversary 5 (Linear Regression). Let f A ( ) be the adversary's guess for the probability density of the error = y − A S (x, t). On input x, y, A S , n, and D, the adversary proceeds as follows:
1. Query the model to get A S (x, t i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Let
(t i ) = y − A S (x, t i ).
Return the result of arg max
When analyzing Adversary 5, we are clearly interested in the effect that generalization error will have on advantage. Given the results of Section 3.3, we can reasonably expect that large generalization error will lead to greater advantage. However, as pointed out by Wu et al. [5] , the functional relationship between t and A S (x, t) may play a role as well. Working in the context of models as Boolean functions, Wu et al. formalized the relevant property as functional influence [18] , which is the probability that changing t will cause A S (x, t) to change when x is sampled uniformly.
As the attack considered here applies to regression models, A S (x, t) is real-valued, and unless the coefficient for t is 0, any change to t will certainly change A S (x, t). However, an analagous notion of influence that characterizes the magnitude of change to A S (x, t) is relevant to inversion in this setting. For linear models, this corresponds to the absolute value of the coefficient associated with t. Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to this quantity as the influence of t without risk of confusion with the Boolean influence used in other contexts.
Binary Variable with Uniform Prior The first part of our analysis deals with the simplest case where m = 2 with Pr z∼D [t = t 1 ] = Pr z∼D [t = t 2 ]. Throughout we assume that A S (x, t 1 ) = A S (x, t 2 ) + τ for some fixed τ > 0, so in this setting τ is a straightforward proxy for influence. Theorem 7 relates the advantage of Adversary 5 to σ D , σ S , and τ . Theorem 7. Let t be drawn uniformly from {t 1 , t 2 } and suppose that y = A S (x, t) + , where
Then the advantage of Adversary 5 is:
Given the assumptions made in this setting, we can describe the behavior of A simplified as returning the value t i that minimizes | (t i )|. If t = t 1 , it is easy to check that A guesses correctly if and only if (t 1 ) > −τ /2. This means that A's advantage given t = t 1 is
Similar reasoning shows that A's advantage given t = t 2 is exactly the same, so the above quantity is the inversion advantage of A.
Clearly, the advantage will be zero when there is no generalization error (σ S = σ D ). Consider the other extreme case where σ S → 0 and σ D → ∞. When σ is very small, the adversary will always guess correctly because the influence of t overwhelms the effect of the error . On the other hand, when σ is very large, changes to t will be nearly imperceptible for "normal" values of τ , and the adversary is reduced to random guessing. Therefore, the maximum possible advantage with uniform prior is 1/2. As a model becomes more and more overfitted, its σ S decreases and its σ D tends to increase. If τ remains fixed, it is easy to see that the advantage increases monotonically under these circumstances. Figure 2 shows the effect of changing τ as the ratio σ D /σ S remains fixed at several different constants. When τ = 0, t does not have any effect on the output of the model, so the adversary does not gain anything from having access to the model and is reduced to random guessing. When τ is large, the adversary almost always guesses correctly regardless of whether b = 0 or b = 1, because the influence of t drowns out the error noise. Thus, at both extremes the advantage approaches 0, and the adversary is only able to learn more about the training data when τ and σ D /σ S are in balance.
General Case Sometimes the uniform prior for t may not be realistic. For example, t may represent whether a patient has a rare disease. In this case, we weight the values of f A ( (t i )) by the a priori probability Pr z∼D [t = t i ] before comparing which t i is the most likely. With uniform prior, we could simplify arg max ti f A ( (t i )) to arg min ti | (t i )| regardless of the value of σ used for f A . On the other hand, the value of σ matters when we multiply by Pr[t = t i ]. Because the adversary is not given b, it makes an assumption similar to that described in Section 3.3 and uses ∼ N (0, σ 2 S ). Clearly σ S = σ D results in zero advantage. The maximum possible advantage is attained when σ S → 0 and σ D → ∞. Then, by similar reasoning as before, the adversary will always guess correctly when b = 0 and is reduced to random guessing when b = 1, resulting in an advantage of 1 − 1 m . In general, the advantage can be computed with the formula ti
by following the steps in the proof of Theorem 7. We first figure out when the adversary outputs t i . When f A is a Gaussian, this is not computationally intensive as there is at most one decision boundary between any two values t i and t j . Then, we convert the decision boundaries into probabilities by using the error distributions ∼ N (0, σ 2 S ) and N (0, σ 2 D ), respectively.
Connection between membership and inversion
In this section, we examine the underlying connections between membership inference and model inversion attacks. Our approach is based on reduction adversaries that assume oracles for either attack, and we characterize lower bounds on the advantage of each reduction adversary in terms of the advantage of its oracle. In Section 6.3, we implement the most sophisticated of the reduction adversaries described here and show that on real data it performs remarkably well, often outperforming model inversion Adversary 5 by large margins. We note that these reductions are specific to our choice of inversion advantage given in Definition 9. Analyzing the connections between membership inference and model inversion using the alternative Definition 10 is interesting future work.
From membership to inversion
We start with an adversary A M→I that uses an inversion oracle to accomplish membership inference, which is shown in Adversary 6. The attack is straightforward: given a point z = (x, t, y), the adversary queries the inversion oracle to obtain a prediction t . If this matches the given value of t, then the adversary concludes that z was in the training data.
Theorem 8 shows that the membership advantage of this reduction corresponds exactly to the inversion advantage of its oracle. In other words, the ability to effectively infer attributes of individuals in the training set implies the ability to infer membership in the training set as well, which suggests that inversion is a more difficult attack than membership inference. Adversary 6 (Membership → inversion). The reduction adversary A M→I has oracle access to inversion adversary A I . On input z = (x, t, y), A S , n, and D, the reduction adversary proceeds as follows:
1. Query the oracle to get A I (x, y, A S , n, D), and let t be the result. 
From inversion to membership
We now consider reductions in the other direction, showing that the ability to infer membership in the training data helps with inferring the attributes of members in the training data. The first such reduction adversary we consider, shown in Adversary 7, makes the simplifying assumption that t is uniformly distributed. It first samples a uniform value t , asks the oracle whether z = (x, t , y) is in S, and concludes that t = t if the answer is "yes".
In practice, the adversary may not know the value t . In such cases, it can estimate the values of Adv M (t i ) by repeatedly sampling S ∼ D n and running Experiment 1. Alternatively, it can assume that Adv M (t i ) ≈ Adv M for all t i and simply let t = arg max ti Pr[t = t i ]. While this assumption is not likely to hold in practice, in some cases it may be a reasonably good approximation. The deterministic reduction adversary has the obvious weakness that it can only return correct answers for points where t = t . Adversary 9 improves on this by making multiple queries to A M . Adversary 9 (Multi-query inversion → membership). Suppose that t 1 , . . . , t m are the possible values of the sensitive attribute t. The reduction adversary A I→M has oracle access to membership adversary A M . On input x, y, A S , n, and D, A I→M proceeds as follows:
1. Query A M to compute the set
Note that this adversary is equivalent to Adversary 8 if the output of A M does not depend on the value of t. The difference between Adversary 8 and this one is that, whereas Adversary 8 gives up if A M ((x, t , y), A S , n, D) = 1, this adversary tries the t i with the second-largest contribution to Adv M , then the third-largest, and so on. As a result, we expect this multi-query adversary to have a larger advantage. This adversary is hard to analyze mathematically because the behavior of the membership oracle on points with arbitrarily chosen t i is unknown. Instead, we analyze its performance experimentally in Section 6.3.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the adversaries discussed in Sections 3 and 4, in addition to presenting a colluding pair of training algorithm and membership adversary. We compare the performance of these adversaries on real datasets with the analysis from previous sections, and show that overfitting predicts privacy risk in practice as our analysis suggests. Our experiments use linear regression, tree, and deep convolutional neural network (CNN) models.
Methodology

Linear and tree models
We used the Python scikit-learn [26] library to calculate the empirical error R emp and the leave-one-out cross validation error R cv [27] . Because these two measures pertain to the error of the model on points inside and outside the training set, respectively, they were used to approximate σ S and σ D , respectively. Then, we made a random 75-25% split of the data into training and test sets. The training set was used to train either a Ridge regression or a decision tree model, which we then passed to membership Adversary 3 as an oracle. Finally, we computed the inversion advantage by taking the true positive rate (Pr[A = 0|b = 0]) less the false positive rate (Pr[A = 0|b = 1]). We repeated this 100 times with different training-test splits and then averaged the result. Before we explain the results, we briefly describe the datasets.
Eyedata. This is gene expression data from rat eye tissues [28] , as presented in the "flare" package of the R programming language. The inputs and the outputs are respectively stored in R as a 120 × 200 matrix and a 120-dimensional vector of floating-point numbers. We used scikit-learn [26] to scale each attribute to zero mean and unit variance. We used Rdige regression with different λ parameters to control for overfitting.
IWPC. This is data collected by the International Warfarin Pharmacogenetics Consortium [29] about patients who were prescribed warfarin. After we removed rows with missing values, 4819 patients remained in the dataset. The inputs to the model are demographic (age, height, weight, race), medical (use of amiodarone, use of enzyme inducer), and genetic (VKORC1, CYP2C9) information. Age, height, and weight are realvalued and were scaled to zero mean and unit variance. The medical attributes take binary values, and the remaining attributes were one-hot encoded. The output is the weekly dose of warfarin in milligrams. However, because the distribution of warfarin dose is skewed, IWPC concludes in [29] that solving for the square root of the dose results in a more predictive linear model. We followed this recommendation and scaled the square root of the dose to zero mean and unit variance. The response is real-valued. We used a decision tree model with different maximum depths to vary the extent of overfitting.
Netflix. We use the dataset from the Netflix Prize contest [30] . This is a sparse dataset that indicates when and how a user rated a movie. For the output attribute, we used the rating of Dragon Ball Z: Trunks Saga, which had one of the most polarized rating distributions. There are 2416 users who rated this, and the ratings were scaled to zero mean and unit variance. The input attributes are binary variables indicating whether or not a user rated each of the other 17,769 movies in the dataset. We ran Ridge regression with different values of λ to vary the extent of overfitting.
Deep convolutional neural networks
We evaluate membership inference advantage on deep CNNs, and our implementation of the colluding training algorithm (Algorithm 1) is a modification of the standard stochastic gradient descent algorithm [31] for training these models. Our evaluation was performed in Python using the Keras deep-learning library [32] . We used three datasets that are standard benchmarks in the deep learning literature and were evaluated in prior work on inference attacks [7] ; they are described in more detail below. For all datasets, pixel values were normalized to the range [0, 1], and the label values were encoded as one-hot vectors. To expedite the training process across a range of experimental configurations, we used a subset of each dataset. For each dataset, we randomly divided the available data into equal-sized training and test sets to facilitate comparison with prior work [7] that used this convention.
The architecture we use is based on the VGG network [33] , which is commonly used in computer vision applications. We control for generalization error by varying the number of trainable parameters in the model, and base this control on a size parameter s that defines the number of units at each layer of the network. The architecture consists of two 3x3 convolutional layers with s filters each, followed by a 2x2 max pooling layer, two 3x3 convolutional layers with 2s filters each, a 2x2 max pooling layer, a fully-connected layer with 2s units, and a softmax output layer. All activation functions are rectified linear. We chose s = 2 i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7, as we did not observe qualitatively different results for larger values of i. All training was done using the Adam optimizer [34] with the default parameters in the Keras implementation (λ = 0.001, β 1 = 0.5, β 2 = 0.99, = 10 −8 , and decay set to 5 × 10 −4 ). We used categorical cross-entropy loss, as is conventional for models whose topmost activation is softmax [31] .
MNIST. MNIST [35] consists of 70,000 images of handwritten digits formatted as grayscale 28×28-pixel images, with class labels indicating the digit depicted in each image. We selected 17,500 points from the full dataset at random for our experiments.
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100. The CIFAR datasets [36] consist of 60,000 32 × 32-pixel color images, labeled as 10 (CIFAR-10) and 100 (CIFAR-100) classes. We selected 15,000 points at random from the full data.
Membership inference
The results of the membership inference attacks on linear and tree models are plotted in Figure 4 . The theoretical and experimental results appear to agree when the adversary knows both σ S and σ D and sets the decision boundary accordingly. However, when the adversary does not know σ D , it performs much better than what the theory predicts. In fact, an adversary can sometimes do better by just fixing the decision boundary at | | = σ S instead of taking σ D into account. This is likely due to the fact that these models do not exactly satisfy our assumption that the errors are strictly normally-distributed. Figure 6 shows that although the training set error distributions roughly match the shape of a Gaussian curve, they have a much higher peak at zero. As a result, it is often advantageous to bring the decision boundaries closer to zero. The results of the threshold adversary on CNNs are given in Figure 5 . Although these models perform classification, the loss function used for training is categorical cross-entropy, which is non-negative, continuous, and unbounded, which suggests that the threshold adversary could potentially work in this setting as well. Specifically, the predictions made by these models can be compared against L S , the average training loss observed during training, which is often reported with published architectures as a point of comparison against prior work (see for example, [37] Figures 3 and 4 , [38] ). Figure 5 shows that while the empirical results do not match the theoretical curve as closely as do linear and tree models, they do not diverge as much as one might expect given that the error is not Gaussian as assumed by Theorem 5.
As a comparison against prior work [7] , we examine the precision and recall of this attack. The greatest recall achieved for each network occurred at s ≥ 64, where it was greater than 0.99 on each dataset. Precision at those configurations was 0.505 (MNIST), 0.694 (CIFAR-10), and 0.874 (CIFAR-100). On datasets of comparable size, Shokri et al. reported the same recall, and precision 0.517 (MNIST), 0.72-0.74 (CIFAR-10), and 0.97-0.98 (CIFAR-100). While our precision numbers are about 0.01-0.1 short on each dataset, the threshold attack used here is significantly simpler and less expensive to run, and makes weaker assumptions of the adversary's knowledge. Whereas the prior attack requires the ability to generate many synthetic datasets (100 for CIFAR, 50 for MNIST [7] ) and auxiliary models, this attack requires only knowledge of L S Figure 6 : Training and test error distributions for overfitted ridge regression and tree models. The horizontal axis corresponds to error, and the vertical axis to the frequency at which that error is observed (experimental) or the probability density of that error (Gaussian). For the Netflix models shown in 6a and 6b, the theoretical error is normally distributed with standard deviation R emp = 0.28 and R cv = 0.89, respectively. For the IWPC models shown in 6c and 6d, the theoretical error is normally distributed with standard deviation R emp = 0.39 and R cv = 0.95, respectively. To minimize the effect of noise, the empirical errors were averaged over 1000 random 75-25 splits of the data into training and test sets. and a single query to the model.
Model inversion and reduction
We now present the empirical inversion advantage of the linear regression adversary (Adversary 5). For these experiments we used the IWPC and Netflix datasets described in Section 6.1. For f A ( ), the adversary's approximation of the error distribution, we used the Gaussian with mean zero and standard deviation R emp . For the IWPC dataset, each of the genomic attributes (VKORC1 and CYP2C9) is separately used as the target t. In the Netflix dataset, the target attribute was whether a user rated (and presumably watched) a certain movie, and we randomly sampled targets from the set of available movies. The circles in Figure 7 show the result of inverting the VKORC1 and CYP2C9 attributes in the IWPC dataset. Although the inversion advantage is not as high as the membership advantage (solid line), the inversion adversary exhibits a sizable advantage that increases as the model overfits more and more. On the other hand, none of the inversion attacks could effectively infer whether a user watched a certain movie in the Netflix dataset. In addition, we were unable to simultaneously control for both σ D /σ S and τ in the Figure 7 : Empirical inversion advantage on decision trees trained with the IWPC dataset, for both linear regression adversary (Adversary 5) and the multi-query reduction adversary (Adversary 9). The threshold membership advantage (Adversary 3) is also shown for comparison with the reduction adversary. The plots correspond to: (a) threshold membership advantage, (b) inversion advantage of uniform reduction adversary, (c) linear regression inversion advantage, and (d) inversion advantage of the multi-query reduction adversary. Both reductions use the threshold membership adversary as the oracle, and f A ( ) for the inversion adversary is the Gaussian with mean zero and standard deviation σ S .
Netflix dataset to measure the effect of influence as predicted by Theorem 7.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the multi-query reduction adversary (Adversary 9). As the squares in Figure 7 show, with the IWPC data, making multiple queries to the membership oracle significantly increased the success rate compared to what we would expect from the naive uniform reduction adversary (Adversary 7, dotted line). Surprisingly, the reduction is also more effective than running the model inversion attack directly. By contrast, with the Netflix data, the reduction adversary was often slightly worse than the naive uniform adversary although it still outperformed direct model inversion. One possible reason for this is that our assumption from Theorem 9, that the membership oracle is equally effective for all values of the target t, does not hold on this data.
Collusion in membership inference
We evaluate A C and A C described in Section 3.4 for convolutional neural networks trained as image classifiers. To instantiate F K and G K , we use Python's intrinsic pseudorandom number generator seeded on the given key K. We note that although this generator does not satisfy the properties assumed by the proof of Theorem 6 in any rigorous sense, our construction does not rely on the unpredictability of pseudorandom numbers, but merely their uniformity. Deviations from this assumption will only result in less effective membership inference results, but are suitable for the purposes of our evaluation. All experiments set the number of keys to k = 3.
The results of our experiment are shown in Figures 8a and 8b . The data shows that on all three instances, the colluding parties are able achieve high membership advantage without significantly affecting model performance. In terms of accuracy, the average difference on test data from standard training was 0.014 (MNIST), 0.047 (CIFAR-10), and 0.031 (CIFAR-100). This was consistently true for larger models (s ≥ 16) where advantage plateaus for all three models close to 1 (≥ 0.98), indicating that model capacity beyond a certain point is a necessary factor in the attack.
Importantly, the results demonstrate that specific information about nearly all of the training data can be intentionally leaked through the behavior of a model that appears to generalize very well. In fact, looking at Figure 8b shows that in these instances, there is no discernable relationship between generalization error and membership advantage. The three datasets exhibit vastly different generalization behavior, with the MNIST models achieving almost no generalization error (< 0.02 for s ≥ 32), and CIFAR-10 showing a large performance gap (≥ 0.46 for s ≥ 32). Despite this fact, the membership adversary achieves nearly identical 
Related Work
The closely related prior work falls roughly into two categories: privacy in summary statistics, privacy and machine learning applications. Throughout the paper we discussed other more distantly-related work on machine learning, differential privacy, and other topics as it was contextually relevant.
Privacy and statistical summaries
There is an extensive prior literature on privacy attacks on statistical summaries. Komarova et al. [39] looked into partial disclosure scenarios, where an adversary is given fixed statistical estimates from combined public and private sources, and attempts to infer the sensitive feature of an individual referenced in those sources. A number of previous studies [19, 20, 40, 41, 42, 43] have looked into membership attacks from statistics commonly published in genome-wide association studies (GWAS). Calandrino et al. [44] showed that temporal changes in recommendations given by collaborative filtering methods can reveal the inputs that caused those changes. Linear reconstruction attacks [45, 46, 47] attempt to infer partial inputs to linear statistics, and were later extended to non-linear statistics [48] . While the goal of these attacks has commonalities with both membership inference and model inversion, our results apply specifically to machine learning settings where generalization error and influence make our results relevant.
Privacy and machine learning
More recently, others have begun examining these attacks in the context of machine learning. Ateniese et al. [1] showed that knowledge of the internal structure of Support Vector Machines and Hidden Markov Models leak certain types of information about their training data, such as the language used in a speech dataset. While this may be perceived as a threat to privacy, in particular in settings where training data is closely-held intellectual property, this attack does not correspond to either type considered in this paper.
Model inversion. Practical model inversion attacks have been studied in the context of linear regression [4, 8] , decision trees [3] , and neural networks [3] . Our results apply to these attacks when they are applied to data that matches the distributional assumptions made in our analysis. An important distinction between the way inversion attacks were considered in prior work and how we treat them here is the notion of advantage. Prior work on these attacks defined advantage as the difference between the attacker's predictive accuracy given the model, and the best accuracy that could be achieved without the model. Although some prior work [3, 4] empirically measured this advantage on both training and test datasets, this definiition does not allow a formal characterization of how exposed only the training data is to privacy risk. In Section 4, we define inversion advantage precisely to capture the risk to training data by measuring the difference in the attacker's accuracy on training and test data: the advantage is zero when the attack is as powerful on the general population as on training data, and maximized when the attack only works on training data.
Wu et al. [5] formalized model inversion for a simplified class of models that consist of Boolean functions, and explored the initial connections between influence and advantage. However, as in other prior work on model inversion, the type of advantage that they consider says nothing about what the model specifically leaks about its training data. Drawing on their observation that influence is relevant to privacy risk in general, we illustrate its effect on the notion of advantage defined in this paper, and how it interacts with generalization error.
Membership inference. Shokri et al. [7] develop a novel and intriguing membership inference attack, and apply it to popular machine learning as-a-service APIs. Their attacks are based on so-called "shadow models" that approximate the behavior of the model under attack. The shadow models are used to build another machine learning model called the "attack model", which is trained to distinguish points in training data from otherwise based on the output they induce on the original model (under attack). As we discussed in Section 6.2, our simple threshold adversary comes surprisingly close to the accuracy of their attack, given the differences in complexity and requisite adversarial assumptions between the attacks.
Because the attack proposed by Shokri et al. itself relies on machine learning to find a function that separates training and non-training points, it is not immediately clear why the attack works, but the authors hypothesize that it is related to overfitting and the "diversity" of the training data. They graph generalization error against the precision of their attack and find some evidence of a relationship, although they also find that the relationship is not perfect, and conclude that model structure must also be relevant. The results presented in this paper make the connection to overfitting precise in many settings, and the colluding trainer we give in Section 6.4 demonstrates exactly how model structure can be exploited to create membership inference vulnerability.
Li et al. [6] explore membership inference, distinguishing between "positive" and "negative" membership privacy. They show how this framework defines a family of related privacy definitions that are parameterized on distributions of the adversary's prior knowledge, and show that a number of previous definitions can be instantiated in this way.
Conclusion
We introduced new formal definitions of advantage for membership inference and model inversion attacks, two broadly-recognized forms of privacy risk in machine learning applications. Our approach quantifies the privacy risk of releasing machine learning models by comparing the performance of an adversary on the training data with that on the general population. Using this definition, we analyzed membership inference and model inversion attacks under various assumptions on learning algorithms and model properties, such as bounded loss function and Gaussian error. Both theoretical and experimental results confirm that models become more vulnerable to both types of attacks as models overfit their training data more severely. Interestingly, our analysis also shows that overfitting is not the only factor that can lead to privacy risk: even stable learning algorithms, which provably do not overfit, an leak precise membership information.
In the case of model inversion, the other relevant factor is the influence of the target attribute on a model's output. Inversion advantage is greatest when the influence is just large enough to allow the adversary to reliably infer the target attribute from the training data, but when it becomes too large it negates the effect of overfitting on advantage. Finally, we showed that these two attacks are closely related through reductions in both directions. In particular, the reduction from model inversion to membership inference is notable because it often results in a better performance than doing model inversion directly.
